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This study examines the language situation in the media discourse on The 
Opposite Direction, al-Jazeera’s flagship talk show hosted by Faisal al-Qasim. It 
investigates the phenomenon of code-switching between Standard Arabic and different 
spoken vernaculars during the talk exchange. Theories of code-switching proposed by 
Gumperz, Giles, and Myers-Scotton et al. are introduced after the history of Arabic 
discourse analysis is briefly discussed. In order to explain under what conditions code-
switching happens, I choose to observe and analyze instances of code-switching in four 
episodes of the program, focusing on the communicative functions and motivations for 
language choice. The applicability of relevant theories is examined to find the theories 
that best account for speakers’ engaging in code-switching in the pan-Arab media 
discourse. 
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CODE-SWITCHING IN ARAB MEDIA DISCOURSE 
 
Introduction 
Arab countries have been described as a diglossic society, in which a high 
language variety - Standard Arabic and a low variety - the local dialect exist side by side. 
In this diglossic situation as defined by Ferguson (1959), the two varieties are markedly 
different and their functions tend to be separated. According to Ferguson, the high variety 
is generally used in formal settings, at school, for university lectures, and on television, 
just to mention a few; the low variety is used by the majority of speakers in informal 
contexts in daily life. This “high-low” dichotomy introduced by Ferguson has justified 
the notion of diglossia to a large extent, with the pan-Arab media discourse being 
considered as a prime example of the use of the high variety - Standard Arabic. 
However, the evolving process of language selection is not automatic and natural 
in this pan-Arab platform. Although Standard Arabic is extensively used for formal 
spoken purposes, it was not until the flourish of transnational media in the Arab world 
that Standard Arabic has been largely used for broadcasting. Before that, different 
dialects had been used in terrestrial television broadcasting. A glance at the history of 
electronic media in the Arab world would suffice to explain this phenomenon. In the 
post-colonial era, terrestrial media were set up solely to preserve political regimes and 
rally support for local governments (Amin 1996). In the meantime, external mass media 
content was largely limited in this “tribal” (rather than pan-Arab) media frame, and only 
apolitical Egyptian films and soap operas could overstep this bound. As a result, most 
daily broadcast programs were in various Arabic vernaculars with few in Standard Arabic 
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in this period of time. On the contrary, transnational media differentiate greatly from 
terrestrial ones in terms of agenda setting: while terrestrial television broadcasting is out 
of state regime initiatives, transnational media stress a pan-Arab agenda (Kraidy 1998). 
Hence, every transnational media outlet has extensively used Standard Arabic in order to 
attract the largest audience possible in the Arab world, and the Arab world has witnessed 
a new type of media discourse that transcends national boundaries. The intimate 
relationship between Standard Arabic and the Arab transnational media discourse has 
been further described by a number of media scholars and others interested in the Middle 
East. For example, Yasir Suleiman (1999, 2003), Noha Mellor (2005), and Marc Lynch 
(2006), among others, have noticed the role of Standard Arabic in Arab media in creating 
a public sphere that affects a nationalist ideology and serves a transnational function in 
the Arab region. 
Yet, a close observation of the language use on the debate shows in this pan-Arab 
media arena reveals that the switching between Standard Arabic and non-standard 
vernaculars is not an uncommon phenomenon. Observing al-Jazeera’s famously 
controversial debate show The Opposite Direction, for example, one will find that many 
of the speakers, including the host Faisal al-Qasim himself, while using Standard Arabic 
most of the time, seem not to hesitate to resort to any spoken vernaculars from time to 
time. This is rather an interesting phenomenon, for the code-switching being observed 
here seems to contradict Ferguson’s notion of diglossia. Thus, the central question of this 
study is: Under what circumstances does code-switching happen in pan-Arab media 
discourse? Further, the study asks: What theories best explain the discourse functions and 
motivations for code-switching? To be more specific, the study examines the 
applicability of Gumperz’s “interactional sociolinguistic” approach, Giles’ 
accommodation theory and Myers-Scotton’s markedness model to the analysis of 
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processes of communication. Before moving on to a discussion of theories of code-
switching, in the section immediately below, I offer a brief discussion of the historical 
background of Arabic discourse analysis. 
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A Historical Review of Arabic Discourse Analysis 
Since the 1960s, a growing number of scholars have devoted themselves to 
research in Arabic discourse analysis and communication theory. As Fakhri (2009) has 
accurately pointed out, due to the predominance of the Standard Arabic as the prestige 
language of the Quranic tradition and literary heritage, many, if not most, of the studies 
have focused on written standard Arabic rather than on spoken vernaculars. Among the 
studies of Arabic written texts, many have focused on such specific characteristics of 
Arabic as being repetitive, parallel and paratactic (Al-Jubouri 1983; Johnstone 1987, 
1990, 1991; Holes 1995; etc.). Al-Jubouri (1984) is one of the pioneers studying the 
phenomenon of repetition and parallelism in Arabic. He pinpoints three levels of 
repetition, namely, repetition at morphological level, at word level, and at the “chunk” 
level, with “chunk” being interpreted as “sentence” or “sentence-like structure” (Al-
Jubouri 1983, 107). Al-Jubouri further investigates repetition at the chunk level and 
identifies parallelism and paraphrase as two major processes of manifestation at this level 
(Ibid). Johnstone also has noted the prevalence of repetition in contemporary Arabic at all 
levels and argues that repetition, parallelism and paraphrase work as persuasive devices 
in Arabic discourse. In Repetition in Arabic Discourse, she explicitly argues that 
“repetition creates linguistic cohesion by evoking classes of items; it creates persuasive 
force by creating classes; and in doing each of these things it creates language” 
(Johnstone 1991, 119).  
While many linguists examine the cohesive phenomena such as repetition and 
structural parallelism in Arabic, others have followed a tradition of contrastive rhetoric. 
Fakhri (1995), for example, investigated the topical structure of English and Arabic 
expository texts in an attempt to “understand the topical structure in the English writing 
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of Arab ESL learners” and “determine whether potential differences between the two 
languages result in transfer in the English writing of Arab ESL learners, or whether these 
learners use an altogether different topical structure indicative of developmental factors” 
(Fakhri 1995, 155-66). Another example is Fareh (1998), who has conducted, within the 
framework of contrastive studies, the functions of the English connective and and the 
Arabic wa in English and Arabic written discourse. His conclusion is that the relationship 
between the functions of and and wa is not a one-to-one correspondence and sometimes 
more than one English connective are needed to replace a wa to avoid awkwardness in 
English translation while on the other hand, oftentimes it is necessary to add Arabic 
connectives between sentences to avoid unnaturalness in Arabic translation. Al-Batal 
(1990) also looks into the discourse functions of connectives such as wa - “and,” lakin - 
“but” and fa - “and so.” As he maintains, Standard Arabic “seems to have a connecting 
constraint that requires the writer to signal continuously to the reader, through the use of 
connectives, the type of link that exists between different parts of the text. This gives the 
connectives special importance as text-building elements and renders them essential for 
the reader’s processing of text” (Al-Batal 1990, 256). 
Indeed, these various linguistic studies on Arabic discourse have put in solid 
efforts to deepen and extend knowledge about the developing field and have made 
tremendous contribution to the field of discourse analysis as a whole. Yet, most of the 
studies are motivated, to a large extent, by pedagogical concerns with second language 
acquisition, and as a result, the focus of these studies has been largely on the language 
forms, or the “linguistic competence,” a concept developed by the linguist Noam 
Chomsky to denote a person’s knowledge of the meaning of sentences and their ability to 
produce grammatically correct sentences. This approach to linguistic studies, as Gumperz 
argues, holds the view that “human cognition can be described in terms of abstract, 
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relationally defined, context free symbolic categories” (Gumperz 1982, 11). As a result, 
the empirical study of actual speech behavior is considered no more than “a means to an 
end” in the analysis and the signaling mechanisms such as intonation, speech rhythm are 
believed not to affect the meaning of a message (Ibid, 12). Although Chomsky’s theories 
about language structure investigate in detail the complex nature of language systems, it 
is however this shift of focus to unobservable and context-free linguistic knowledge that 
makes the Chomskyan approach narrow in scope. After all, it is the use of language that 
is the fundamental feature of language, not a meta-language that is independent of 
language. And as a result, Chomsky’s program has become the target of many empiricist 
criticisms.  
In contrast to the relatively large body of research that focuses on the linguistic 
competence, there exist a relatively small group of sociolinguistic studies that have 
adopted a “communicative competence” approach to investigate Arabic discourse. 
“Communicative competence” is a concept proposed by Dell Hymes to attack on the 
narrow conception of Chomskyan linguistics. As explained by Gumperz, “[w]hereas 
linguistic competence covers the speaker’s ability to produce grammatically correct 
sentences, communicative competence describes his ability to select from the totality of 
grammatically correct expressions available to him, forms which appropriately reflect the 
social norms governing behavior in specific encounters” (Gumperz 1972, 205). Here the 
key point is that there must be other kinds of knowledge, in addition to the knowledge of 
the language, that make possible the effective use of language. In this regard, 
Widdownson quite rightly comments that “there are rules of use without which the rules 
of grammar would be useless” (Widdownson 1995, 95).  
Within the rather broad domain of Arabic sociolinguistics, where the focus has 
moved to language usage in a socio-cultural context and to how language functions in 
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interactions in the real world, Ferguson’s well-known article “Diglossia” (1959) marks a 
milestone. His model, by incorporating the spoken language, shifts away from the 
tradition of interpreting written Arabic texts. His proposal that there is a high variety that 
is learned in schools and a low variety that is acquired naturally still seems valid and the 
concept of “diglossia” has soon become an indispensable concept for a corpus of 
sociolinguistic works. Taking the initial inspiration from “Diglossia,” a number of Arabic 
sociolinguists have started concentrating on “variety and variation” (Suleiman 1995, ix). 
Holes (1983, 1987, 1995), for example, has continuously explored the relationship 
between dialect change and social structural changes in the Arab world. Another good 
example is Haeri’s (1996) sociolinguistic investigations in Cairo, in which she 
rationalizes the preference of Cairene women for using pronunciations belonging to the 
vernacular varieties rather than Standard Arabic, leading to her conclusion that gender 
has played an important role in the progress of linguist change and women are more 
“innovative” than men in their speech. On the other hand, Yasir Suleiman represents a 
prime example of a small but growing number of scholars who have made tremendous 
achievements in dealing with the crucial role of the Arabic language in marking and 
preserving the national identity, in unifying the society, and in articulating the pan-Arab 
ideology (e.g. Suleiman et el. 1994, 1999, 2003, etc.). Still, as Suleiman himself 
acknowledges, many of the studies on Arabic discourse that investigate the relationship 
between language and society have arisen as a consequence of the “theoretical and 
methodological advances emanating from Labov’s work” (Suleiman 1994, ix). 
Conversely, few anthropological linguistics that carry out linguistic ethnographies have 
appeared to offer a “more detailed, complex, and realistic analysis of the language 





Labov’s variationist approach, also referred to as the “social factors” approach, 
holds the view that the crucial forces behind linguistic choices lie in the larger 
community, and as a result, “[i]ndividual behavior can be understood only as a reflection 
of the grammar of the speech community,” and “[l]anguage is not the property of the 
individual, but of the community” (Labov 1989, 52). It is thus the speech community that 
becomes the primary object of Labov’s linguistic investigation. For example, in his 
(1966) study of the employees of three major New York department stores, Lavob 
examines the loss of postvocalic “r” in their speech (e.g. “fourth” is pronounced “foth”) 
and looks for a correlation between social class stratification and different ways of saying 
the same thing. The impression is that little about the individual speakers has to be 
understood while the cumulative effect of observing many of them is what matters. This 
top-down approach certainly has not been shared by many anthropological linguists. 
This anthropological linguists’ ethnographic research, which can be also 
categorized as “sociolinguistics,” has “shifted the analytical issue ... to questions such as 
how and by what signaling devices language functions to evoke the contextual 
presuppositions that affect interpretation and how to determine what presuppositions are 
at work in particular talk exchanges” (Gumperz 1999, 456-7). As such, these studies 
position language in its social context by means of communication rather than language 
itself, and shift the focus from communities to actual talk and performance as the 
principle basis of analysis. Among the anthropological linguists are Harold Garfinkel, 
Erving Goffman, Dell Hymes, John Gumperz, and others.  
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Garfinkel, a forerunner in ethnographies, is justly famous for his ethnographical 
experiments that unveil the techniques people use to construct their social world and 
maintain social order. His (1967) analysis of Agnes, an inter-sexed person, is deemed the 
sacred text for ethnographic research. Goffman is another representative of ethnographic 
scholars, who as well believes in the functional essentiality of individual’s performances 
in generating, maintaining and renegotiating social order. As he states in his famous and 
widely published book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, “when an individual 
appears before others he will have many motives for trying to control the impression they 
receive of the situation. This report is concerned with some of the common techniques 
that persons employ to sustain such impressions and with some of the common 
contingencies associated with the employment of these techniques” (Goffman 1959, 15). 
Hymes’s contribution, as Gumperz points out, lies in his insights that “instead of seeking 
to explain talk as directly reflecting the beliefs and values of communities, structuralist 
abstractions that are notoriously difficult to operationalize, it should be more fruitful to 
concentrate on situations of speaking or ... speech events” (Gumperz 2003, 215). 
Gumperz, mainly concerned with the interaction through which the speakers 
signal and interpret meaning, has initiated an innovative strand of ethnographic work 
referred to as “interactional sociolinguistics.” Whereas many conversational analyses 
have yielded insights into the interactive nature of conversation, they still tend to take for 
granted the conversational cooperation and the inferring process. Interactional 
sociolinguistics, by contrast, has no assumption that the common ground in 
communication is pre-existing or presupposed, as Gumperz puts it:  
Linguistic and cultural boundaries are not just “naturally” there, they are 
 communicatively and, therefore, socially constructed. Thus, they cannot be 
 essentialized and treated as self-contained islands in research on communicative 
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 practices. Apart from interaction as such, ideology, power and history are all 
 central to the way diversity works; depending on how these factors interrelate in 
 specific circumstances, interaction can serve either to accentuate or attenuate 
 the effects of diversity (Gumperz 2003, 111). 
 
It is then the purpose of interactional sociolinguistic analysis to “demonstrate the 
sharing of inferential procedures” and to “show how diversity affects interpretation” 
through “ethnographically informed in-depth analysis of what transpires in an encounter” 
(Gumperz 1999, 459). In light of this, speaking is considered to be “a reflexive process 
such that everything said can be seen as either directly reacting to preceding talk, 
reflecting a set of immediate circumstances or responding to a past event, whether 
directly experienced or indirectly transmitted” (Ibid, 461). 
Gumperz’s program, as Bruss precisely points out, is similar to psychoanalysts 
utilizing strategies to “interpret and use their own seemingly unmotivated emotional 
responses to their patients,” and as a result, the two disciplines “share the task of 
identifying and then analyzing types of communication which are not overtly structured 
in speech” (Bruss 1986, 115). In identifying such types of communication, a musical 
example introduced by Auer may serve as a starting point. Auer, in discussing a passage 
from Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, illustrates how a switch to “straightforward, almost 
primitively transparent C major” has helped “steer the interpretation of linguistic signs” 
and “mean something different from what is said”(Auer 1992, 1-3). Such types of 
communication, verbal and non-verbal signals that function to convey information for 
people to use in continuous interpretation, have been called “contextualization cues.” As 
such, context is no longer treated as given in interaction, but rather it is something that is 
construed through the inferential practices being engaged in accordance with conventions 
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that speakers may or may not share, or as Gumperzs puts it, through the processes of 
“contextualization.” Furthermore, as Gumperz (1999) contends, in the process of making 
inference or “contexualization,” constant negotiation and renegotiation of interpersonal 
relationships have been maintained. As Appel and Muysekn note:  
Language forms do not have a social meaning by themselves but only in so far as 
the participants in the interaction agree on this meaning. The latter is crucial; the 
social meaning of language does not depend on the speaker alone, not on the 
hearer alone but on an agreement, the result of negotiation as it were, between 
speaker and hearer (Appel and Muysekn 2006, 28). 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING THE KEY CONCEPTS 
This analysis builds upon Gumperz’s interactional sociolinguistics to examine the 
language situation of the pan-Arab media discourse and investigate the phenomenon of 
code-switching between Standard Arab and different spoken vernaculars during the talk 
exchange. Before the data analysis, I believe it necessary to elaborate the two concepts of 
“diglossia” and “code-switching” to show how they relate to one another and how they 
can fit into the framework of interactional sociolinguisitics that focuses primarily on 
interaction rather than language itself. 
 
Diglossia 
The term “diglossia” was first introduced by Karl Krumbacher in 1902 in his 
book Das Problem der Neugriechischen Schriftprache. However, the commonly accepted 
view is that it was the French linguist William Marcais who inspired C. A. Ferguson’s 
coinage of the term “diglossia” in his 1959 article by the same name (Zughoul 1980). 
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Although Ferguson cannot “copyright” the concept of diglossia himself, his 
groundbreaking article has marked its defining moment and is now considered the classic 
reference for diglossia. In this article, Ferguson examines four “defining languages” of 
diglossia in depth: Greek, Arabic, Swiss-German and Haitian Creole, each of which has 
both superposed high variety and regional low varieties. In his often-quoted passage, 
Ferguson defines “diglossia” as  
a relatively stable language situation in which in addition to the primary dialects 
 of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a 
 very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed 
 variety the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature either of an 
 earlier period or in another speech community which is learned largely by formal 
 education and used for most written and formal spoken purposes but not used by 
 any sector of the community for ordinary conversation (Ferguson 1959, 336). 
 
As Ferguson identifies in the article, Arabic is the language that shows the major 
characteristic of the diglossic phenomenon: There is the Standard Arabic, or its modern 
variant, Modern Standard Arabic, that is the “high” (H) variety, and the colloquial Arabic 
that is the “low” (L) variety. Whereas the Standard Arabic is the higher language that is 
acquired through formal education and thus limited to the educated elites who use it in 
formal domains, the lower variety is used extensively in informal domains within the 
whole Arab society. The keynote here, is the strict separation of domains of language use. 
The Standard Arabic is universally used for written communication and formal spoken 
occasions, such as sermons in churches or mosques, university lectures, news broadcast, 
and political debates and speeches. The various spoken dialects, on the other hand, are 
used for everyday casual communication at home or on the street. 
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It is noteworthy here, that Ferguson has made clear in his article that diglossia 
refers to a situation where “two or more varieties of the same language are used by some 
speakers of a speech community under different conditions” (Ferguson 1959, 325), and 
“no attempt is made ... to examine the analogous situation where two related or unrelated 
languages are used side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly 
defined role” (Ibid.). Yet, this definition has been misinterpreted by Joshua Fishman, who 
has extended the application of diglossia to societal bilingualism, saying that diglossia 
“was initially in connection with a society that used two (or more) languages for internal 
(intra-society) communication” (Fishman 1967, 29). Although comments concerning the 
consequences of many writers using Fishman’s definition and applying diglossia to 
bilingualism are not relevant here, it is however necessary to pinpoint the original 
definition of diglossia to avoid misapplication of Ferguson’s criteria.    
Zughoul is one of the Arab scholars that take the classic definition of diglossia by 
Ferguson. He argues that the co-existence of Standard Arabic and other vernaculars in 
Arabic is considered a “hindrance to educational and economic development, as well as 
national coherence” (Zughoul 1980, 202), suggesting that “the only solution for the 
problem of Arabic diglossia is to reinforce the use of Classical Arabic in its Modern 
Standard form with linguistic reform to make the language easier to learn, easier to 
understand, and easier to produce” (Ibid, 213). The High-Low dichotomy of diglossia 
implied in Zughoul’s analysis, however, is not shared by Shahir El-Hasaan, for example. 
As Youssef Mahmoud points out, El-Hasaan contends that “Ferguson’s description of the 
societal alternation between the two forms of Arabic tended to be too categorical and 
impressionistic and had overlooked the range of sociolinguistic variation encountered in 
the speech of educated Arabic speakers,” and that “the language situations Ferguson had 
cited as the exclusive domains of each language variety are not as hermetically separated 
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as he had thought” (Mahmoud 1986, 239). Although I believe that Ferguson’s 
sociolinguistic framework of diglossia is valid to a large extent, I also agree with El-
Hasaan’s contention that Ferguson does not consider the intermediate forms of the 
language. Due to this shortcoming of his program, Ferguson, while stressing the 
linguistic dichotomy between the High variety and the Low variety, does not address the 
use of two codes within the same discourse in a satisfactory manner. 
 
Code-switching 
Although numerous attempts have been made to define “code-switching,” a 
precise definition has proved to be difficult. Many have defined code-switching as the 
mixing of elements of two languages or two codes within the same communicative event 
(sf. Argenter 2001, 379; Gluth 2008, 2). This definition, however, seems rather narrow. 
Gumperz’s broader definition of code-switching differentiates between metaphorical, or 
conversational, code-switching and situational code-switching. According to him, 
conversational code-switching is defined as the “juxtaposition within the same speech 
exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or 
subsystems” (Gumperz 1982, 59). While this notion of conversational code-switching 
overlaps with the commonly used definition of code-switching, Gumperz has also 
identified situational code-switching, where the change of codes is triggered by the 
change of situation. As Gumperz himself puts it, situational code-switching refers to the 
change of language where “[d]istinct varieties are employed in certain settings (such as 
home, school, work) that are associated with separate, bounded kinds of activities (public 
speaking, formal negotiations, special ceremonials, verbal games, etc.) or spoken with 
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different categories of speakers (friends, family members, strangers, social inferiors, 
government officials, etc.” (Ibid, 60).  
It is not hard to realize that what Gumperz calls situational code-switching is of 
the diglossia-type, where code alternation is quite stable, and only occurs when situations 
or norms are changing. Thus, Gumperz’s coinage of situational code-switching certainly 
champions Ferguson’s framework of diglossia. However, in his interactional 
sociolinguistic perspective, Gumperz is interested in the conversational, or metaphorical, 
code-switching rather than the diglossia-type situational code-switching. Gumperz has 
observed that while social setting remains the same, some speakers still switch from one 
code to another. For example, in a study undertaken in the Norwegian village of 
Hemnesberget, Blom and Gumperz (1972) find that a local resident approaches a clerk’s 
desk, and extends greetings and asks about family affairs using Ranamal, the local variety 
of Norwegian, but uses Bokmal, the standard Norwegian variety when doing the official 
business. Gumperz points out that “an individual’s choice of speech style has symbolic 
value and interpretive consequences that cannot be explained simply by correlating the 
incidence of linguistic variants with independently determined social and contextual 
categories (Gumperz 1982, vii). Gumperz elaborates this phenomenon of code-switching 
by making the distinction between the “we code” and the “they code,” stating that: 
The tendency is for the ethnically specific, minority language to be regarded as 
 the “we code” and becomes associated with in-group and informal activities, and 
 for the majority language to serve as the “they code” associated with the more 
 formal, stiffer and less personal out-group relations (Gumperz 1982, 66). 
 
This understanding of conversational code-switching is very important, because 
the “we” and “they” dichotomy serves to symbolize the interrelationships of language 
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users, rather than merely reflect the social norms, as proposed by Ferguson. As Gumperz 
argues, “rather than claiming that speakers use language in response to a fixed, 
predetermined set of prescriptions, it seems more reasonable to assume that they build on 
their own and their audience’s abstract understanding of situational norms, to 
communicate metaphoric information about how they intend their words to be 
understood” (Ibid, 61). Gumperz enumerates six specific conversational functions of 
code-switching: Quotations; Addressee specification; Interjections; Reiteration; Message 
qualification; Personalization versus objectivization (Ibid, 75-80). 
Peter Auer is another influential contributor to the theories in the sociolinguistic 
branch of code-switching studies. He agrees with Gumperz that context is not something 
that is given, but rather, it is constructed through continuous interactions among 
participants. Thus, Auer is in line with Gumperz in suggesting that the notion of 
contextualization is most promising in building a model to account for conversational 
code-switching. However, Auer is dissatisfied with Gumperz’s listing functions of code-
switching, maintaining that it is impossible to summarize a set of categories of functions 
of code-switching because the functions of code-switching are virtually open-ended and 
indefinite, and that it is more fruitful to focus on analyzing how code-switching functions 
as what is described by Gumperz as a “contextualization cue.” As he writes, “There is a 
certain danger for the pendulum to swing too far ... i.e., to treat each and every instance 
of language alternation as meaningful in the same ‘semantic’ way” (Auer 1984, 105). 
Still, Auer sees the interactional meaningfulness of code-switching as “creat[ing] 
interactional and rhetorical effects, just as contrasts in loudness, pace, and pitch do” 
(Woolard 2006, 79). 
Howard Giles is also a prominent researcher who has made important 
contributions to the understanding of social meaning of code-switching. Under his 
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theoretical framework of speech accommodation theory, later revitalized as 
communication accommodation theory, Giles tries to “explain some of the motivations 
underlying certain shifts in people’s speech styles during social encounters and some of 
the social consequences arising from them” (Beebe & Giles 1984, 7). According to Giles’ 
theory, participants during social interaction “are motivated to adjust (or accommodate) 
their speech styles as a means of evoking listeners’ social approval, attaining 
communicational efficiency between interactants, and maintaining positive social 
identities” (ibid). This strategy is termed “speech convergence.” By contrast, there also 
exists “speech divergence,” by which speakers “accentuate vocal differences between 
themselves and others” (ibid). Speakers’ linguistic choices and listeners’ perception of 
and reaction to these choices are thus central to Giles’ program. Giles and his associates’ 
work on accommodation theory is highly relevant to understanding the social motivations 
for code-switching. For example, Giles, Taylor and Bourhis (1973) have studied code-
switching by examining eighty bilingual Canadians in the bilingual city of Montreal. It 
was found that Anglophone students were more likely to switch to French, which is their 
weaker language, with their Francophone interlocutors when the latter converged to 
English, which is the latter’s weaker language. This has shown that interlocutors 
accommodate mutually to each other’s code choice to promote interpersonal 
relationships. On the other hand, Bourhis and Giles (1977) have also conducted an 
experiment to demonstrate that Welsh people tend to use accent divergence when their 
feeling of ethnic identity is threatened. According to Giles et al. (1987), interactants may 
diverge in order to (1) maintain a positive in-group identity, (2) dissociate themselves 
socially from a partner, (2) render a partner less powerful, or (3) entice an interlocutor to 
adopt a different speech behavior. 
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Last but by no means least, is Carol Myers-Scotton. Further elaborating the 
functional approach to code-switching, Myers-Scotton has devised the markedness model 
(MM) to account for speakers’ socio-psychological motivation of code-switching 
between languages. Recognizing the limits of variable-based analysis, Myers-Scotton in 
her theory suggests that even though most choices reflect larger societal background, 
speakers are creative and rational actors “in the sense that, at some level of 
consciousness, they are making choices that do not simply reflect their social group 
memberships or the type of speech event in which they are participating or the structure 
of the event” (Myers-Scotton 1998, 19). Myers-Scotton believes that each linguistic 
variety used in code-switching has social associations, and speakers’ exploiting the 
possibility of making code choices from their linguistic repertoire is indexical of a 
specific kind of interrelationship, including speakers’ attitudes to and expectations from 
each other, or the so-called “rights-and-obligations set” (RO set), that is in force during 
the exchange. 
Myers-Scotton sees code-switching as a principle-governed phenomenon. 
According to her, “[t]hese principles hold that choices in specific interactions are best 
explained as cognitively based calculations that depend on the actor’s estimation of what 
actions offer him/her the greatest utility” (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001, 2). Myers-
Scotton proposes four principles of code-switching:  
1. Sequential unmarked code-switching. “When on or more of the situational 
factorschange within the course of a conversation, the unmarked RO set may 
change.... Whenever the unmarked RO set is altered by such factors, the speaker 
will switch codes if he or she wishes to index the new unmarked RO set” (Myers-
Scotton 1993, 114). 
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2. Code-switching as the unmarked norm. “Speaking two languages in the same 
conversation [as the unmarked norm between bilingual peers] ... each switch ... 
does not necessarily have a special indexicality; rather, it is the overall pattern 
which carries the communicative force” (Ibid, 117). 
3. Code-switching as a marked choice. “A marked choice derives its meaning from 
two sources: first, since it is not the unmarked choice, it is a negotiation against 
the unmarked RO set; and second, as ‘something else,’ the marked choice is a call 
for another RO set in its place, that for which the speaker’s choice is the 
unmarked index” (Ibid, 131). 
4. Code-switching as an exploratory choice. “When an unmarked choice is not clear, 
[speakers] use code-switching to make alternate exploratory choices as candidates 
for an unmarked choice and thereby as an index of an RO set which [they] favor” 
(Ibid, 142). 
 The markedness model follows directly on from Giles’ speech accommodation 
theory that explains code-switching as strategic and goal-oriented. For Myers-Scotton, 
the goal of speakers is “to enhance rewards and minimize costs” or “to optimize” (Myers-
Scotton 1998, 19). That is to say, sometimes speakers prefer one variety to another when 
expressing the same idea because they expect certain benefits from that choice relative to 
the costs. For example, for Arabs the preferred variety in family environments is a 
colloquial vernacular. However, if in educational or professional contexts, colloquial 
vernaculars are standing out from the immediate context and as a result, are viewed as 
disadvantaged. Comparatively, Standard Arabic in local settings is viewed as “standing-
out,” but is preferred in formal contexts. Yet, for Myers-Scotton, this goal-oriented code 
choice does not necessarily mean that this switching has a social motivation. Myers-
Scotton differentiates between the unmarked choice and the marked choice. In any given 
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interaction speakers will infer the unmarked RO set from the context and switch codes to 
comply with the unmarked RO set of the relevant interaction type. In other words, 
speakers use the unmarked code-switching strategy because it is just the casual way of 
speaking for them. When the context changes, the speakers will change code, as a 
normative code choice, to conform to the expected RO set in the new context. By 
contrast, speakers also use the possibility of making code choice to “negotiate a change in 
the expected social distance holding between participants, either increasing it or 





The main topic of this study is the analysis of code-switching in the pan-Arab 
media discourse. Although Ferguson’s proposal of diglossia posits pan-Arab media as the 
domain of Standard Arabic, code-switching does occur from time to time in the pan-Arab 
media discourse. Thus, the central question this study asks is: Under what conditions 
does code-switching happen in the pan-Arab media discourse? Further, the question is: 
What theories best account for code-switching? The applicability of relevant theories 
proposed by Gumperz, Giles, and Myers-Scotton that attempt to explain the discourse 
functions and motivations for code switching will be determined. 
 
THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND  
An analysis of the Arab media discourse from a sociolinguistic perspective is not 
possible without reference to the social agents that have created and transformed it. In 
order to truly understand the discourse, it is necessary to situate it in the sociocultural 
context. When examining this context, several scholars have provided ingenious insights 
into the issue. Lynch rightly argues, “where Arab public life had for decades been 
dominated by the voice of the state, al-Jazeera ushered in a new kind of open, contentious 
public politics in which a plethora of competing voices clamored for attention” (Lynch 
2006, 2). Rinnawi (2006) has a similar contention. He argues that the emergence of Arab 
transnational media represented by al-Jazeera and other new satellite television stations 
has eroded the relatively rigid media structure existing in the Arab world for more than 
forty years. Rinnawi further argues that a shared sense of Arab nationalism has been 
created as a result of the flourish of transnational media in the Arab world, ranging from 
Saudi Arabia in the East to Morocco in the West. He uses the word McArabism to refer 
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to the situation in which the citizens throughout the Arab world receive identical pan-
Arab content via transnational media and thus place all the issues into an Arab narrative. 
As Rinnawi argues, McArabism emerges from “indigenous mechanism” through which 
transnational media push for freedom to select contents in order to attract the largest 
audience possible rather than from any progressive pan-Arab policies. 
Both Lynch and Rinnawi have recognized the impact of Arabic language satellite 
television stations on the flow of information in the region and the cultivation of Arab 
public as a result. Yet this is not the first time that the Arab media have taken advantage 
of a crucial moment in the history of transnational broadcasting to shape a pan-Arab 
agenda. Recall The Voice of the Arabs, Egypt’s radio service in the 1950s and 1960s, 
when the radios acquired by the illiterate poor across the Arab world helped The Voice of 
the Arabs gain instant popularity throughout the region and create huge potential to 
challenge the legitimacy of the newly established Arab states. As The Voice of the Arabs 
reached across national borders and blended domestic and regional issues, a sense of 
national identity was claimed to be created in the general context of anti-colonialism and 
socialism agenda in the Third World. 
Reviewing this period of history and comparing it with the era of the Arab 
transnational media based on satellite television, Internet and other new technologies, 
however, depict much more differences than similarities between the two slices in the 
history of transnational broadcasting. The first time that the Arab nationalist rhetoric was 
reached was in July 1954, when Gamal Abdul Nasser, who adopted leadership of the 
Arab nationalist movement, declared on the second anniversary of the revolution that 
“the goal of the government of the revolution is that the Arabs become a united nation” 
(Jankowski 2001, 32). In this context, The Voice of the Arabs became Egyptian 
propaganda instrument emphasizing the theme that the Arab unity was the path of 
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realizing victory. In contrast to The Voice of the Arabs, Qatar’s al-Jazeera by no means 
implies the peninsular emirate’s aspirations to Arab leadership, although al-Jazeera has 
given Qatar more leverage politically and regionally. In this vein, a critical difference can 
be argued: When Gamal Abdul Nasser launched The Voice of the Arabs, his belief was 
that the media mediated in a top-down fashion and could be utilized as an instrument of 
anti-imperialism; Al-Jazeera, on the contrary, was launched in the hope that bottom-up 
media could play their role in the social development and in this case, in the realization of 
a pan-Arab ideology. 
This difference has crucial implications for the interactional sociolinguistic 
analysis of Arab media discourse. As Gumperz asserts, “Communication is a social 
activity requiring the coordinated efforts of two or more individuals. Mere talk to produce 
sentences, no matter how well formed or elegant the outcome, does not by itself 
constitute communication. Only when a move has elicited a response can we say 
communication is taking place” (Gumperz 1982, 1). Given Gumperz’s strict definition of 
communication, we can examine The Voice of the Arabs in a different fashion, thus 
enabling us to reflect the new Arab public sphere represented by al-Jazeera from a 
different perspective. Although in the retrospect many would recall the Arab diva Umm 
Kalthoum and connect her legendary “voice of the Arabs” to The Voice of the Arabs as 
her music was often being used on this Egyptian radio to attract audiences throughout the 
region, the speeches on the radio, which can be categorized as “mere talk to produce 
sentences,” still suffered a loss of credibility after the defeat of Egypt in the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War. As Jacoby notes, Arab defeat in the 1967 War soon “destroyed the credibility 
of those Arab leaders who claimed patronage over the Palestinian cause, particularly 
Egypt’s President Gamam Abdel Nasser” and “caused a transition of power in the Arab 
world that paved the way for the emergence of the Palestinians as an independent factor 
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in the Arab-Israeli Conflict” (Jacoby 2007, 17). Thus, the question to what extent the 
Arab audience was mobilized by The Voice of the Arabs to support the pan-Arab 
nationalism championed by Nasser still remains unanswered. Al-Jazeera, which is 
represented by its flagship program The Opposite Direction, on the other hand, has 
provided platforms for individuals to engage themselves in arenas that “require the 
coordinated efforts of two or more individuals.” This understanding is critical to the 
analysis, because only when genuine communication is in existence, is the bottom-up 
interactional sociolinguistic approach meaningful. 
 
WHY STUDYING AL-JAZEERA’S THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION 
Although many Arab critics, along with their Western counterparts, have 
criticized that contemporary Arab political discourse suffers from a lack of rationality and 
serious scholarly credibility (Ajami 1999; Makiya 1998), the significance of pan-Arab 
media cannot be denied. Take, al-Jazeera’s The Opposite Direction for example, it is true 
that many of the guests have excessive and single-minded zeal, especially for an extreme 
religious or political cause. It is true that many, if not most, of the guests attending the 
program would wave their hands in the air while they debate fiercely and relentlessly, 
their voices trembling with outrage and fury. However, it is also true that Arabs are 
creating a culture of dialogue and communication in the context of pan-Arab 
communications integration. 
Since pan-Arab media is the central subject of this study, I find it necessary to 
locate a proxy for it and I have decided to use al-Jazeera and specifically, its flagship talk 
show The Opposite Direction as a vehicle for depicting the pan-Arab media discourse. 
This is not a random procedure. According to a poll conducted by Zogby International 
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and the University of Maryland in May 2004, al-Jazeera is the first choice for 62 percent 
of satellite news viewers in Jordan, 66 percent in Egypt and 44 percent in Saudi Arabia 
(Shapiro 2005, 28). One could argue that al-Jazeera is perhaps the most watched and 
most credible Arab satellite television. As for The Opposite Direction, a live program 
where two guests with contrary views argue with one another with al-Qasim moderating 
as the host, is “undoubted the most popular and most controversial political talk show in 
the history of Arab television” (Bahry 2001, 92). 
Many viewers would feel a hint of a thrill at the show’s opening credits, for the 
dazzling montage of different guests waiving their hands and pointing their fingers while 
they argue heatedly. Their voice is muted, and the background is filled with powerful and 
fast-paced music that seems to be intended to convey a sense of urgency. Immediately 
upon a fade-out of music, al-Qasim sits calmly along with his guests in front of the 
camera and begins posing his opening questions after greeting the audience briefly.  
His framing of the arguments to come is striking and unique: Not only are the 
questions in an extremely elaborate and elegant manner, reflecting the exceptionally rich 
rhetorical tradition of Arabic, more important is the fact that al-Qasim would frame the 
argument from two exactly opposite points of view. As Lynch argues, “such open 
arguments over the most sensitive issues, involving strong representatives of both sides 




I draw on a set of 464 episodes of The Opposite Direction aired on al-Jazeera 
between January 1998 and December 2007. I browse the official transcript available at 
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www.aljazeera.net and translate the title of each episode into English. A list of episode 
titles with the original air dates is provided in Appendix A. The purpose is to gain a 
general understanding of what is discussed on The Opposite Direction. From the large 
pool of data available, I have arbitrarily chosen for analysis four episodes that vary in 
content. However, the selection process is not random, for each episode has been chosen 
for certain reasons.  
The first episode, titled “a clash of civilization,” is chosen because there is a 
heavily edited video clip of this episode available online, in which one of the two guests, 
Wafa Sultan, a secular psychologist of Syrian-American origin is dominating the show, 
criticizing brutality of Islam and Islamic terrorism, while the other guest, Ibrahim al-
Khuli, Professor of Islamic Studies in al-Azhar University, is barely shown speaking at 
all. My original interest in this episode stems from my intention to reveal a neutral and 
objective look of the program. The second episode, titled “women’s issue in the Arab 
world,” is chosen specifically because of Nawal al-Saʿdawi, for she is the first Arab 
woman to write about the politics of sex, and is a prime example of feminist activists that 
challenge the traditional values of Islam. The third episode, tackling the issue of 
Sudanese identity, is chosen because Sudan occupies a unique position spanning the Arab 
world and that of other cultures, making the issue of identity very much controversial for 
Sudanese people. The last episode, discussing the issue of media freedom, has been 
chosen because it is the first time in history that a U. S. official who has mastered Arabic 
appear in front of Arab audience speaking Arabic. Admittedly, the fact that I resort to 
subjectively selecting issues to tackle in this paper may to a large extent hinder the 
representativeness of the selected samples, it is still hoped that this paper can shed some 




For each episode being analyzed, I first translate the opening questions posed by 
the host Faisal al-Qasim, because these provocative questions that reflect dissenting 
views provide a general framework for the heated discussion to come and is thus essential 
for understanding what gets discussed in the program. The English translation is 
presented in Appendix B. Then, I choose to analyze one or two instances of code-
switching in each episode in detail. In choosing theses instances of code-switching, I am 
not only aware that language is layered level upon level, but also mindful that language is 
a cyclical matter and we can start the cycle anywhere. As a result, while I strive to 
provide enough background information to facilitate a better understanding of the 
context, I do not hesitate to analyze the phenomenon of code-switching that occurs in the 
middle of a conversation. Using the audio recordings available online, I try to transcribe 
Arabic directly as it is pronounced to keep the flavor of a real conversation. My 
transliteration of Arabic follows the system that the Library of Congress recommends, 
namely, the ALA-LC transliteration system. Passages in non-standard Arabic dialects are 
italicized, whereas passages in Standard Arabic are not. Each passage is followed by an 
English translation in parentheses. 
 
EXAMPLE ONE 
This episode features Wafa Sultan, a critic of Islam and Ibrahim al-Khuli, a 
religious professor, and was aired on February 21, 2006. In this episode the speakers 
debate on the sensitive and controversial issue of the clash of civilizations facing the 
Arabs in the contemporary world. The point of the debate is to depict the Western 
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perceptions as well as the Arab views toward the “clash of civilizations” theory in general 
and the concept of “clash of religions” in particular.  
After al-Qasim starts the show by posing a series of questions, the two guests 
begin to argue about the definitions of culture, civilization, and religion. Wafa Sultan’s 
statement that she understands from Ibrahim al-Khuli that civilization means human 
beings immediately provokes a storm of protest from al-Khuli, as he at once gives a roar 
of rage saying: “Not true.” While Sultan tries to ignore al-Khuli and continues her 
argument, al-Khuli, angered by Sultan’s distorting his opinion, keeps shouting and 
interrupting Sultan.     
(1.1) Wafa Sultan: Fahimtu min hādhā l-kalām anna l-haḍārah bi-raʾyi l-ustādh 
Ibrahīm hiya l-insān… (I understood from these words that civilization in 
Professor Ibrahim’s opinion means human beings…) 
(1.2) Ibrahim al-Khuli (Interrupting): Laysa ṣaḥīhan… (Not true…)  
(1.3) Wafa Sultan: Muqāranah basiṭah bayna… (A simple comparison  
 between…) 
(1.4) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Lam aqul hādhā… (I did not say this…) 
(1.5) Wafa Sultan: al-Mujtamaʿāti l-Islāmiyah… (Islamic societies…) 
(1.6) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Laysa hādhā ma qultuhu… (This is not what I said…) 
(1.7) Wafa Sultan: huwa qāla inna… (He said that…)  
 
Here al-Khuli is expressing his feeling of annoyance and the message being 
conveyed is quite personal rather than formal. He uses first person pronouns several 
times, and his speaking rate, with which one utterance succeeds another, is rather fast. 
Yet, al-Khuli is still capable of speaking in Standard Arabic. A good example is utterance 
(1.2), in which al-Khuli uses a Standard Arabic negative construction, complete with 
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correct case-making. Certainly, al-Khuli’s awareness of his own social characteristics 
affecting language use is a necessary starting point, but it is argued here that al-Khuli, in 
his own interpretation and negotiation process, opts to use what Gumperz terms as the 
“they” code. That is to say, al-Khuli is not obliged to use the “they” code in this specific 
setting, because the message he means to convey is rather personal. But he willingly 
chooses to do so. A plausible explanation of this fact is that al-Khuli is accommodating 
his interlocutors. He is saving al-Qasim’s face, if not Sultan’s. 
Faisal al-Qasim, on the other hand, does not hesitate to use the Levantine dialect 
as he tries to control the discussion and allows Sultan a chance to finish her argument. 
(1.8) Faisal al-Qasim: Bas daqīqah, tafaḍḍali. (But a minute (to Ibrahim al-Khuli), 
 please (to Dr. Wafa).) 
 
Here the shift in code is not marked in the sense that it represents what people 
may have actually said, and the two words bas and daqiqah assimilate phonetically and 
rhythmically to form one message, so that the total conversational effect is that of an 
utterance spoken in one single language variety. Thus, we find ourselves in a paradox: On 
the one hand, if we analyze this code-switching under the framework of Myers-Scotton’s 
markedness model and refer to the code-switching as an “unconscious” lapse of attention, 
we are tempted to interpret it as what Myers-Scotton describes as “code-switching as the 
unmarked norm,” with no particular discourse function or communicative effect being 
realized. In other words, if the speaker al-Qasim is not aware of his own usage of code-
switching, it is impossible for him to assign any function to this conversational switching; 
on the other hand, however, if we follow Gumperz’s approach, we see clearly that the 
code-switching in conversation is always purposeful as a discourse-related cue, and 
whether or not it is “conscious” is beside the point.  
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In this example, one of the functions this code-switching performs is to mark an 
interjection that is more accessible to the audience. If al-Qasim chooses not to use spoken 
Levantine Arabic but Standard Arabic, a correct way to say “wait a moment” would be 
“Intaẓir qalīlan.” It is clear that the colloquial expression is more accessible and much 
easier to pronounce. Another function is for addressee specification, that is, to single out 
al-Khuli as the particular addressee. Moreover, it can be argued that the code-switching 
here has a “personalization” function. Gumperz (1982) has specified that the code 
contrast could relate to the degree of speaker involvement in a message, to whether a 
statement reflects personal opinion or knowledge, or to whether it indicates the authority 
of generally known fact. In this example, it can be argued that al-Qasim’s using code-
switching to interrupt al-Khuli’s talk demonstrates his high level of personal involvement 
in the discussion, his strong personal annoyance with al-Khuli’s unprofessional behavior, 
as well as his emphasis on his authority as the moderator. In this way, certain goals have 
been achieved and al-Qasim himself may or may not be aware as the speaker. 
Ibrahim al-Khuli, right upon his receiving the message, signals his understanding 
of al-Qasim’s main aim and gives an obvious negative response as he immediately 
changes his addressee to al-Qasim, saying:   
(1.9) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Lā... Lā tuḥammiluni ma lam aqul… (No… Don’t impose 
on me what I didn’t say…) 
 
EXAMPLE TWO 
This episode was aired on May 5th, 1998. The speakers are Yusuf al-Badri, 
member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and Nawal al-Saʿdawi, a famous 
Egyptian feminist writer, activist and physician. During this episode, the speakers debate 
on Arab women’s intellectual equality and biological inferiority, on present social and 
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political situation of Arab women, on religious and traditional shackles on Arab women, 
among other related topics. As usual, Faisal al-Qasim frames the show by posing to the 
audience a series of questions about Arabs’ failure to protect women’s right, about the 
dimensions of the issue of the human rights of women, and about the failure of the Arab 
women’s movements. Then al-Qasim starts the discussion by asking al-Saʿdawi to 
describe the situation of Arab women, and the following is Saʿdawi’s response: 
(2.1) Waḍʿ l-marʾah l-ʿArabīyah lā yumkin an yufham illā bi-rabṭiha bi-l-
qaḍiyah l-siyāsīyah l-ʿālamīyah wa-l-ʿArabīyah wa-l-mushkilah l-usarīyah yaʿnī 
hākadhā tanawuli li-qaḍiyat al-marʾah fa-kayfa atakallam ʿani l-marʾah bi-dūn 
an atanāwal al-iqtiṣād aw al-siyāsah aw al-ḥarb aw al-silm? kul dah murtabiṭ bi-
baʿḍihi fa-anta bi-tasʾalni ʿan mushkilat al-waṭan al-ʿArabi kulluh wa-laysa 
faqaṭ mushkilat niṣfi l-muqtamaʿ li-anna l-nisāʾ hunna niṣf l-muqtamaʿ, ayyi 
intikās iqtiṣādī ayyi istiʿmār ayyi istighlāl yanʿakis ʿ alā l-riqāl wa-l-nisāʾ zay 
baʿḍ fa-idhan hiya al-qaḍīyah… qaḍīyat l-waṭan dilwaʾtī… (The situation of 
Arab women cannot be understood except by linking it to the global and Arab 
political issue and family problem. Well... Thus, to address the issue of women... 
How can I speak of women without addressing the economy or politics or war or 
peace? They are related to each other. So you are asking me about the problem of 
the whole Arab nation and not just the problem of one-half of society, because 
women are one-half of society. Men and women are reflected in economic 
recession, in colonization, and in exploitation, and so on and so forth. Then, it is 
the issue… the issue of the nation-state now…) 
 
In this passage, al-Saʿdawi begins with Standard Arabic, albeit with no explicit 
case-making, to state the necessity to consider economic and political factors when 
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talking about the situation of Arab women. As she continues, her sentences gradually 
become fairly colloquial in form, spoken in a fast tempo, with the code shifting more 
towards Egyptian colloquial Arabic. She consistently uses Egyptian colloquial phonemes 
like q instead of the Standard Arabic j. This is in sharp contrast with al-Qasim’s using 
highly marked Standard Arabic feature in his opening verse, pronouncing mood and case 
endings in each instance.  
Here al-Saʿdawi’s use of colloquial Arabic is rather striking. As is expected from 
a formal situation of this kind, al-Saʿdawi should share knowledge about the basic 
purpose of the interaction and be socially conscious to use Standard Arabic rather than 
Egyptian dialect to match herself to this particular situation she is in. One might argue 
that the fact that al-Saʿdawi starts out speaking a form of Standard Arabic but gradually 
drifts into a form of Arabic more obviously like Egyptian vernacular indicates her lack of 
linguistic competence and inability to maintain the flow of speech using Standard Arabic. 
I cannot agree, for al-Saʿdawi herself is a very important player on the contemporary 
Arab intellectual scene, one of the most prolific feminist writers in twentieth-century 
Arab countries, and boasts an enormous readership both inside and outside the Arab 
world. She is known for both of her novels and her essays on Arab society, both written 
first in her native Arabic. For an intellectual elite like al-Saʿdawi, a perfect command of 
Standard Arabic is essential. Thus, using Standard Arabic in formal domain should not be 
a problem to her.   
We should therefore assume that the speaker is manipulating language to realize 
some communicative functions of code-switching, as Gumperz (1982) suggests. 
Although Gumperz has rightly pointed that an individual plays the major role in code-
switching, the several functions of code-switching he identifies seem to have limited 
relevance here. Al-Saʿdawi’s code-switched passage does not have a quotation, nor does 
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it serve to direct the message specifically to one of the other two interlocutors, because 
both of al-Qasim and al-Badri speak Standard Arabic. No reiteration is found in the 
passage. The main message is conveyed in both Standard Arabic and Egyptian dialect, 
and neither language variety is used to qualify the message. In addition, although al-
Saʿdawi uses first person singular pronouns, the message in this passage is far from 
personal, and the shift from Standard Arabic to Egyptian dialect does not correspond to a 
change from objective factuality to personalized statement. The only thing that can be 
said about this code-switched passage is that the code-switching serves to mark an 
interjection or sentence filler. Yet, “interjection” and “sentence filler” per se are merely 
names for linguistic structures; their functions are another issue that remains unaddressed. 
If we look at this code-switched passage from Myers-Scotton’s perspective, we 
can argue that the code-switching is a marked choice not only because it is used in a 
formal context, in which communication is established with non in-group members and 
formal Arabic is conventionally expected, but also because al-Saʿdawi should have a 
priori knowledge of which code choice is appropriate in the setting. If not, she should 
become aware of this conventional expectation as her interlocutors constantly remind her 
that they wish to be addressed in Standard Arabic. They accomplish this by resorting to 
an implicit strategy, namely, using the language of choice and pronouncing correct mood 
and case endings. See Faisal al-Qasim’s response to al-Saʿdawi as follows: 
(2.2) Faḍīlatu s-shaykh, hal yumukin an nulakhkhiṣa al-ʿamalīyah bi-akmalihā  
bi-annahā dhāt abʿād siyāsīyah wa-qtiṣadīyah bahtah? (Sheikh (al-Badri),  
 can we sum up that the process as a whole has political and economic  
 dimensions?)   
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Seeing that al-Saʿdawi does not conform to Standard Arabic, we can argue that 
al-Saʿdawi is trying to negotiate a new balance in the relationship with the other two 
interlocutors. That is to say, by switching from Standard Arabic to Egyptian Arabic, al-
Saʿdawi is intended to convey to her addressees this message: “Put aside any 
presumptions you have based on societal norms for these circumstances. I want your 
view of me, or of our relationship, to be otherwise” (Myers-Scotton 1993, 131). As such, 
we may assume that al-Saʿdawi is asserting some role in the process. As Myers-Scotton 
argues, “A major motivation for variety in linguistic choices in a given community is the 
possibility of social identity negotiations” (Ibid, 111). Then, the questions are: What 
identity does al-Saʿdawi want to reinforce? Why does al-Saʿdawi want to emphasize 
this social identity? 
The first question is not hard to answer, for the Egyptian dialect is undoubtedly an 
important component of the Egyptian identity. The second question is rather complicated. 
One relatively simple answer is that al-Saʿdawi is safeguarding the linguistic heritage of 
the Egyptian dialect. Indeed, of all Arab countries, Egypt is the one with the most 
prominent tendency towards the use of the dialect. As Haeri notes, although generally 
considered to be nonstandard, some primary dialects, including the Egyptian dialect, 
“belong to important urban centers” and “represent a sort of urban standard variety that 
has prestige and that those outside of such centers must learn for purposes of 
communication and assimilation” (Haeri 2000, 65). That is to say, perhaps in al-
Saʿdawi’s opinion, the Egyptian dialect is the “standard” language variety that carries 
prestige, in comparison with Standard Arabic. We may further explain that al-Saʿdawi, 
by manipulating linguistic variation and constructing an image of the Egyptian identity, is 
attempting to reach out to and represent some specific group of people. In my opinion, 
this group could be literate Arab females. Although they understand the higher level of 
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Standard Arabic, they for the most part have a favorable attitude towards the colloquial 
language. As a result, al-Saʿdawi, in a culturally intimate way, becomes the voice of the 
Arab women, expressing their ideas in their own language. 
Giles’ accommodation theory may also shed some light on the analysis of al-
Saʿdawi’s engaging in code-switching. Al-Saʿdawi could have used the “right” language 
to get the job done without stirring up a conflict, but she opts for the opposite: Rather 
than neutralizing underlying conflict and accommodating her interlocutors, al-Saʿdawi 
chooses to diverge linguistically from her interlocutors through choice of code. It is 
obvious that al-Saʿdawi strives to maintain a positive in-group identity and distance 
herself from her interlocutors in order to represent certain group of people, as I have 
previously suggested. Another proposed motivation is to render her partners less 
powerful. That is to say, code switches are used here to convey authority, to “cripple” the 
ability of outsiders to interact efficiently and effectively, if enticing an interlocutor to 
adopt a this communicative style is not possible. According to Giles, there is still an 
important motivation for choosing a linguistic strategy, that is, to signal dislike or 
disapproval of the other interlocutors. This motivation becomes more obvious after al-
Saʿdawi is continually interrupted by al-Badri, as she complains: 
(2.3) Ṭayyib, ana dilwaʾtī iḥnā… anta dakhalta fi l-khalāyā wa-ma aʿṭatnish  
 furṣah yaʿnī… ana darast al-khalāyā yaʿni daʿnī atakallam… (Fine, right  
 now let’s… if you enter into a cell… and he didn’t give me chance well… I 
 have studied the cell, well, let me speak…) 
 
Here Al-Saʿdawi switches to Egyptian dialect to emphasize her annoyance at not 





 This episode, which was aired on January 23, 2007, deals with the identity of 
Sudan. The two guests participating in the debate are respectively AbuBakr al-Qadi, 
Chairman of the General Congress for the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel 
group involved in the Darfur conflict of Sudan and Sayf al-Din al-Bashir, Editor-in-Chief 
of Sudan Vision, a pro-Sudanese government newspaper. The main issues about which 
the whole debate revolves are the conspiracy against the Arab and Islamic identity, the 
conflict between the dominant culture and minority culture, as well as the clash of 
cultures and national fragmentation in Sudan. 
In the opening questions posed to the audience, al-Qasim first condemns the 
conspiracies against Sudan’s Arab-Islamic identity. Then, he takes a 180-degree turn and 
begins to point out that Sudan has the most acute crisis of national identity and the Arabs 
are the minority. After presenting both sides of the dispute, al-Qasim directs the first 
question to AbuBakr al-Qadi, asking him whether there is a conspiracy to obliterate 
Sudan’s Arab identity. In his response, al-Qasi voices his opinion that it is the Arab 
government’s own mistake that strangles the settlement of Darfur issue. He says: 
Bismillāhi r-Raḥmāni r-Raḥīm anta taʿrifu naẓarīyata l-muʾāmarah l-ʿArabīyah. 
Ana… idhā kān fī ayyi jihah fī l-ʿālam tataʾāmaru ʿalā s-Sudān hādhā shaʾnuha. 
Lākin ana aqūl ma yajrī fī s-Sudān huwa min kasbi aydinā wa-min akhṭāʾina 
nahnu, as-Sudān idhā kān yaʿnī fīhi ḥushūd ḥawla Tshād aw fī Afrīqiyā l-wasṭā 
aw fī quwwatin umamīyah hādhā bi-sabab akhṭaʾinā nahnu. Iḥnā khalaqnā 
mushkilat al-janūb iḥnā l-ḥukūmah wa-aʿnī kulla l-ḥukūmāt bi-ma fihā al-inqādh 
min sanah 1956 ilā yawminā hādhā. Akhṭāʾunā hiya l-lati jalabat ilaynā ẓ-ẓurūf 
illī nahnu fihā saqaṭati l-bawābāt fī l-ʿIraq bi-sabab akhṭāʾi n-niẓām niẓām 
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Ṣadām Ḥusayn l-bāʾid wa-n-niẓām fī s-Sudān ṣaḥīḥ yaʿnī al-janūb ʿarḍah li-
linfiṣal bi-sabab akhṭāʾinā nahnu wa-siyāsātinā nahnu. Al-Janūbiīn ṭalaba fī sanah 
1956 muṭālib basīṭah jiddan hiya l-fadrālīyah wa-rafadnā fī muʾtamar l-māʾidah 
l-mustadīrah kullu aḥzabina rafaḍat hādhā l-kalām wa-fī n-nihāyah kharaja l-
Janūbiīn wa-tabaddalati l-qiyādat wa-jāʾat qiyādah ṭalabat fī n-nihāyah taqrīr l-
maṣīr iḥnā fī Dārfūr anta taqūl al-waḍʿ khaṭīr fī Dārfūr iḥnā shaʿb Dārfūr 
Muslim wa-yuḥibbu l-waḥdah akhshi an tatakarrara l-tajribah l-ʾān l-ḥāṣilah fī l-
janūb iḥnā l-ʾān nuṭālib bi-muṭālib basīṭah jiddan… (In the name of Allah. You 
know the Arab conspiracy theories. If anyone in the world conspires against 
Sudan, this is his issue. But I say that what is happening in Sudan is due to our 
own mistakes. The fact that the troops or international forces are in Chad or in 
central Africa is because of our own mistakes. We created the problem of the 
South, it is because of our government, and I mean all the governments since the 
rescue of Sudan in 1956 to our day. We are in such circumstances because of our 
own mistakes. The gates in Iraq fell due to the mistakes of Saddam Hussein’s 
deposed regime. And speaking to the regime in Sudan, it is right to say that the 
South is prone to separation because of our own mistakes and our own policies. 
The Southerners had a very simple demand in 1956 - the demand for federalism. 
All of our parties rejected this demand in the round table conference and in the 
end the leadership changed and the Southerners demanded self-determination. 
You say that the situation in Darfur is dangerous. We Darfurians are Muslims and 
we embrace unity and now we have a very simple demand…)         
 
Here central to our analysis is what cultural identity and group membership al-
Qadi is intended to construct. To start with, we must acknowledge the fact that al-Qadi’s 
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social identity has multiple dimensions. On the one hand, he is a Muslim. This can be 
suggested from the fact that al-Qadi starts his turn with “in the name of Allah,” or the 
“basmala,” which has a special significance for Muslims and is used by them in a number 
of contexts. For pious Muslims, basmala is so important that they rarely begin any 
activity without first reciting the verse. On the other hand, al-Qadi also represents an anti-
government group in Sudan. Because the government in Khartoum has the Arab-Islamic 
identity, being anti-government may be seen as being ant-Arab and anti-Muslim. This is 
particularly true if we consider that the program is aimed at a pan-Arab audience that has 
a shared stance on pan-Arab and Islamic issues. One of al-Qasim’s opening questions 
may reflect this audience perception, as he asks: “How are those Sudanese that doubt 
about the Arab identity of Sudan different from those Iraqis that came at the back of the 
American tanks and devoted all their efforts to depriving Iraq of its Arab identity?” As a 
result, we see in al-Qadi multiple and conflicting identity elements: He is a Muslim that is 
anti-Muslim. 
However, following Gumperz’s approach, I argue that al-Qadi is not in a position 
that he can do nothing but accepting his conflicting identity. Rather, I argue that by 
manipulating language al-Qadi has the ability to mark a change in the role his is playing, 
or he is perceived as playing. That is to say, al-Qadi may decide to play on the Muslim 
element of his identity, or he may decide to play on the anti-government element of his 
identity. He chooses to do so in different situations to convey different messages. In this 
passage, it can be argued that the role that al-Qadi assigns to himself is that of a Muslim 
as a Muslim, not as a member of an anti-government group. To start with, al-Qasi uses 
first person plural pronoun twice stressing that what happens in Sudan is due to “our” 
mistake. Without making specific reference, al-Qadi offers himself an opportunity for 
ambiguous identity, a chance for him to be perceived as an in-group member by his Arab 
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audience, with no regard to his political affiliations. His use of independent pronoun 
nahnu in addition to the suffix pronoun has a particularly striking effect. This 
independent pronoun could be omitted without affecting the grammatical correctness of 
the sentence; however, the emphasis on the subject would be substantially reduced 
without this written Arabic phraseology. To further project his Arab-Muslim identity and 
emphasize it, al-Qadi exploits the local dialect and uses ihna to underscore his personal 
involvement and emotional communication. Recall Myers-Scotton’s argument that 
speakers as rational actors make code choices to enhance rewards and minimize costs. In 
this passage, al-Qadi’s switch from Standard Arabic to colloquial Arabic has marked a 
powerful feature of language, that is, to declare his in-group membership in front of his 
Arab audience. He is not speaking as a representative of an anti-government group, but 
rather, as an all-encompassing voice that represents the Arab Muslims as a whole. 
Presumably his Arab audience will give him much credit as al-Qadi switches from the 
“they-code” to the “we-code” in the process of language choice, and this will be the 
“reward” that al-Qadi can expect from indexing one particular element of his identity. 
 
EXAMPLE FOUR 
This episode was aired on November 20, 2001, one week after one US Air Force 
aircraft bombed al-Jazeera’s Kabul office. One of the two guests is Christopher Ross, a 
former U.S. ambassador to Syria. When he guested this program in 2001, he served as the 
U.S. State Department counterterrorism coordinator. The other guest is Ibrahim Alloush, 
the editor in chief of an Arab think-tank’s website, the Free Arab Voice on the Internet. 
The topic for this episode is the freedom of American media. Al-Qasim first poses a 
series of questions criticizing the American media for being slanted in favor of US 
government and against the Arabs. Then, upon using the symbolic “on the other hand,” 
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al-Qasim begins to offer a sturdy defense of the American media by arguing that the 
media war is an essential part of the military war and the American media have their right 
to fashion their coverage to guide and reflect public opinion. The first question al-Qasim 
asks Christopher Ross is simple and straightforward: Why was al-Jazeera’s bureau in 
Afghanistan bombed? Before Ross gets an opportunity to answer the question, Alloush 
interrupts in an aggressive and offensive tone, asking whether the bombing of al-
Jazeera’s bureau in Afghanistan is a prelude for bombing the bureaus of those channels 
that disagree with the American media. When Ross takes his chance after al-Qasim’s 
prompt interference, he starts with greeting to the host and the audience, manifesting his 
sociability and his Arab cultural awareness. Al-Qasim’s immediate response “thank you” 
indicates his understanding of this language cue. Then Ross starts his main argument, 
saying: 
Arfuḍu ṭ-ṭarḥ arfuḍu hādhā ṭ-ṭarḥ, al-Wilāyātu l-Muttaḥidah ma ʿindahā shayʾ 
ḍidda… lā fī Kābūl, lā fī Qaṭar, lā fī Amrīkā, wa-wujūdī bi-hādhā l-astūdiyū 
yudill ʿalā innahu hunāka nawʿ mina t-taʿāwun al-iʿlāmī. bi-n-nisbah li-maktab 
Kābūl, al-Quwwatu l-Amrīkīyah fī Afghānistān tastahdif al-munshaʾāt wa-l-
ʿanāṣir al-ʿaskarīyah faqaṭ, lā tastahdifu al-Munshaʾah l-iʿlāmīyah aw ghayraha 
mina l-munshaʾāt al-madanīyah. Wa-bi-raghm min juhūdinā fī hādhā li-t-tijāh 
ṭabʿan taḥṣul baʿḍa l-aghlāṭ, baʿḍa l-aghlāṭ fī stiʿmāli l-asliḥah mathalan, wa-
lākin li-ḥaddi l-ʾān lā naʿrif mādhā ḥaṣala bi-ẓ-ẓabuṭ bi-n-nisbah li-maktab 
Kābūl, lākin naʿrif… naʿrif tamāma l-maʿrifah annahu lam yakun hādhā l-
maktab bayna ahdāfinā, fa-ʿalaynā an nantaẓir shuwayya li-naʿrif ma ḥaṣal. (I 
reject the approach. I reject this approach. The United States doesn’t have any 
thing against (al-Jazeera), not in Kabul, not in Qatar, not in America. And my 
presence in this studio demonstrates that there is a kind of media cooperation 
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(between the United States and Al-Jazeera). As for (al-Jazeera’s) Kabul bureau, 
the U.S. troops in Afghanistan are targeting the military sites only, not targeting 
the media sites or other civil sites, and despite our efforts in that regard, there is 
bound to be some faults in using the weapons for example. But up to this point, 
we don’t know exactly how the al-Jazeera bureau was bombed, but we do know 
for sure that it wasn't among our targets. So let’s wait a little bit and see what 
happened.) 
 
 The puzzle to be solved in this passage is whether conversational code-switching 
always serves an expressive function and has pragmatic meaning. The answer seems to 
be true according to Gumperz. First, in introducing his notion of “metaphorical code-
switching,” Gumperz stresses that if code-switching does not correspond to changes in 
situational context, speakers must be manipulating language choice to bring about new 
contexts and to achieve special communicative effects. Further, in proposing a number of 
discourse functions of code-switching, Gumperz includes marking interjections or 
sentence fillers as one example. However, it is argued that code-switching under this 
category in itself does not denote any discourse effect, but rather, it happens only because 
the speaker lacks the appropriate terminology in one language which actually possesses it 
but does not make part of this speaker’s repertoire. Thus, under Myers-Scotton’s 
markedness model, we are inclined to argue that Ross’s switching from Standard Arabic 
to Levantine dialect does not convey any implicit information that goes beyond their 
actual words, nor does it redefine social situations. Recall the motivations that can be 
suggested for a speaker to switch from one language variety to another. First, we cannot 
argue that code-switching in this passage carries a social meaning of solidarity. For one 
thing, it is meaningless to argue that Ross, by using Levantine dialect, is trying to 
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establish a cultural relationship with a specific group of addressees, namely, the pan-
Syrian audience, because the topic of the show and the platform itself, are both pan-Arab 
rather than regional. For another, if Ross is intended to convey his message of solidarity 
to the masses, he should choose to use Standard Arabic to signal his shared group 
membership as an intellectual, because all the participants in this program share the same 
well-educated background. In the same vein, we cannot argue that Ross’s diverging from 
his addressees’ preferred language functions as a means of distancing himself from his 
audience, because this argument will contradict Ross’s claim that his presence in the 
studio demonstrate a kind of media cooperation between the United States and al-Jazeera. 
In other words, Ross does not have any intention to distance himself from his Arab 
audience, but on the contrary, he aims to accommodate to his listeners, and the “right” 
language variety to use in this case should be Standard Arabic rather than any local 
dialect. As a result, the only conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that code-
switching in this example does not have a social motivation, nor does it denote any 




The purpose of this study is to explain speakers’ engaging in code-switching in 
the pan-Arab media discourse. The theories and models being discussed here have 
offered many possible answers. However, it should be noted that code-switching is 
indeed a highly complex phenomenon and to reliably account for the occurrence of code-
switching has proved to be a difficult task. 
 
ACCOUNTING FOR CODE-SWITCHING  
In example one, the show host al-Qasim utilizes code-switching from Standard 
Arabic to Levantine dialect to extend his control over the discussion and here code-
switching is used to express his authority as mediator over one of the participants in 
debate. In example two, al-Saʿdawi consciously switches the code to Egyptian dialect to 
distance herself from her interlocutors and to put herself closer to her intended audience. 
Example three demonstrates that code-switching can be utilized to construct and 
reinforce certain cultural identity and group membership. The last example, on the other 
hand, seems to reveal that Ross utilizes code-switching only as a strategy to overcome 
language deficits. 
From the examples it can be said that code-switching is a universal phenomenon 
that is not limited to one speech community. Al-Qasim is a Syrian Druze who has 
received higher education at an English university; Al-Saʿdawi is a native Egyptian who 
has extensive experiences in the Western world; Al-Qadi has the Arab African dual 
identity; Ross is a native American who deeply appreciates the nuances of Arab culture 
and Arab politics. It thus can be suggested that difference across type of speaker, be it 
gender, ethnicity, educational background, is not a determining variable that affects the 
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occurrences of code-switching. In the same vein, it can be argued that different topics for 
discussion, as well as difference in circumstances, are not determining variables that 
code-switching depends on. However, an interesting contrast can be made between native 
speakers of Arabic and those for whom Arabic is not the first language. On the basis of 
the analyzed texts, although the distinction between the native speakers and non-native 
speakers does not affect the occurrences of code-switching, it does have an effect on 
whether code-switching plays a role as a discourse-related cue: For native Arabic 
speakers code-switching can be manipulated to carry out various communicative 
functions; for a non-native speaker like Ross, code-switching seems to be no more than a 
mark of linguistic deficiency. 
The question is then raised as to why there is a discrepancy between native 
speakers’ and non-native speakers’ ways of using code-switching. A plausible 
explanation is that native speakers have a good command of the language and are very 
sensitive to deviations from the “norm.” In the process of mixing Standard Arabic and 
colloquial dialect, native speakers understand the linguistic and cultural subtlety that 
language contact offers in shaping communicative contexts. Non-native speakers, on the 
other hand, may not have the capacity to take advantage of the subtle mechanisms of 
code-switching and play on subtle differences between the two dialects. In other words, 
for native speakers there is a larger “diglossic” vocabulary pool from which they can 
draw, but for non-native speakers the totality of their second language repertoire might be 
smaller. Even if the varieties of the second language are part, rather than total, of the non-
native speakers’ verbal repertoire, they still may not be proficient in using them 
appropriately.    
 
APPLICABILITY OF RELEVANT THEORIES  
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Gumperz’s interactional sociolinguistic approach has provided the point of 
departure for Auer and Myers-Scotton, for Gumperz’s notion of code-switching has been 
shared by both of them as a site for constructing meaning through juxtaposition. 
However, although Gumperz’s interactional view of code-switching opens up the 
possibility of examining code-switching functions directly, the set of categories of 
functions identified by Gumperz relate more to inter-sentential rather than intra-sentential 
code-switching, thus making his list of functions less relevant in this study, because most 
of the incidences of code-switching in the examples are intra-sentential. Further, this 
categorization of discourse functions does not link the interactional level with broader 
social relations and some of the functions such as interjections do not reveal much about 
the speaker’s social motivation and the goals he or she wants to achieve. Admittedly, 
Gumperz in his discussion of the “we-code” and “they-code” builds a link between code-
switching and preserving group or cultural identity. Still, it is rather descriptive and too 
simple to account for the complexity of code-switching as in the analysis it is shown that 
sometimes a particular code choice does not denote any communicative effect nor 
redefine the social situation. 
Speech accommodation theory is a handy tool to describe the motivations of 
certain language behavior, either for accommodating addressees or diverging from them. 
However, it is the sole focus on the addressees that makes the theory limited in scope and 
irrelevant when code-switching is for the speaker’s own communicative goals.  
Myers-Scotton’s markedness model, reckoning with both the micro and macro 
levels, seems to be the most comprehensive explanatory theory among alternative 
theories. However, a major drawback of this model is that by arguing that speakers are 
rational actors, this model relates speakers’ motivations to conscious calculations. This 
seems to contradict speakers’ speech behavior, as many instances of code-switching in 
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the daily conversation is a product of unconscious language choice. This unconscious 
code-switching, however, may still convey certain motivations that the speakers 






Appendix A: A list of episode titles of The Opposite Direction 
01/06/1998 Shura Councils: A Step to Democracy 
01/20/1998 Tribe and Arab Nationalism 
01/27/1998 Democracy and Shura in Arab/Islamic Countries 
02/03/1998 Relationship between America and Arabs 
02/10/1998 Iraq crisis 
02/17/1998 Iraq-Kuwait Crisis 
02/24/1998 Arab Nationalism 
03/10/1998 Situations of Kurds in Iraq 
03/18/1998 Evaluation of Western liberalism 
03/24/1998 One Year after the Copenhagen Declaration 
03/31/1998 Socialism 
04/14/1998 Moroccan Opposition 
04/21/1998 Arab League 
05/05/1998 Women’s Issue in the Arab World 
05/26/1998 Celebration of the French Campaign in Egypt 
06/09/1998 Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb 
06/16/1998 Minorities in the Arab world 
06/23/1998 Fate of Palestinian Refugees 
10/27/1998 Democracy in the Arab world 
11/10/1998 Palestinian National Authority and its Dealings with the Resistance 
11/24/1998 Israeli Penetration in the Arab Media 
01/05/1999 Islam and political systems 
01/12/1999 Arab Summit 
01/19/1999 Elections in Israel 
01/26/1999 Algeria’s Elections and the Circumstances 
02/02/1999 Is There an Arab Conspiracy against Iraq? 
02/09/1999 Hezbollah… Guerrillas or Agents? 
02/16/1999 Twenty Years after the Iranian Revolution 
02/23/1999 Ocalan, and the Kurdish Issue 
03/02/1999 Borders among the Arab States 
03/09/1999 International Campaign against Islamists 
03/16/1999 Tenth Anniversary of the Establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union 
03/23/1999 Relationship between Lebanon and Syria 
03/30/1999 Balkan War and the Situation of Serbs 
04/06/1999 Arab-Zionist Conflict 
04/13/1999 Algeria’s Elections and the Circumstances 
04/20/1999 Morocco Prevents the Program Opposite Direction from Airing 
04/27/1999 The Era of Rebels and the Era of America’s Globalization 
05/04/1999 Birth Control: Between Conspiracy and Religion 
05/11/1999 Arab National Conference 
05/18/1999 Hijab Crisis in Turkey 
05/25/1999 Sudan and Nimeiri's Return 
06/01/1999 The Ocalan Trial (part two) 
06/08/1999 The Conflict in Kashmir 
06/16/1999 Nasser’s Era and the Arab Situation 
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06/22/1999 Arab Rulers and their Successors 
06/29/1999 Ottoman Caliphate… Blessing or curse? 
07/06/1999 Ocalan Sentence 
07/13/1999 Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 
07/20/1999 Future of the South Lebanon Army 
07/27/1999 Is Barak a Man of Peace? 
08/03/1999 The Copenhagen Group 
08/10/1999 Iraqi Opposition 
08/17/1999 Palestinian Factions and Dialogue with the Authority 
08/24/1999 The Ninth Anniversary of the Siege of Iraq 
08/31/1999 State of Emergency/ Emergency Laws in the Arab Countries 
09/07/1999 Armed Struggle Movements in the Arab World 
09/14/1999 Referendum on Civil Concord in Algeria 
09/21/1999 Colonialism and Arab Regimes 
09/28/1999 The Arab boycott of Israel 
10/05/1999 Human Rights in the Arab world 
10/12/1999 Arab-Israeli Conflict 
10/19/1999 Islamic Political Parties in the Arab World 
10/26/1999 Tunisia’s elections and National Reconciliation 
11/02/1999 Military Regime and its Effect on Societies 
11/09/1999 The Secret Relationship between Mauritania and Israel 
11/16/1999 Attitudes of Muslims toward Chechnya War 
11/23/1999 The Sponsorship System and the Theme of Naturalization in the Gulf Countries  
11/30/1999 Israel’s Attempts to Eliminate the Arabs 
12/07/1999 Sudanese Opposition 
12/14/1999 American Perception of the Arabs and Muslims 
12/28/1999 The Arabs and the Celebration of Twentieth-Century 
01/04/2000 Ramadan Celebration 
01/11/2000 At the Twelfth Anniversary of the Establishment of Hamas 
01/18/2000 Normalization with Israel 
01/25/2000 The Syrian-Israeli Negotiations 
02/01/2000 Arabic poetry 
02/08/2000 The Current Moroccan Regime 
02/15/2000 Israel and the European Campaign against Austria 
02/22/2000 The Issue of Khula (divorce at the instance of the wife, who must pay a 
compensation) 
02/29/2000 Iran-Iraq War 
05/09/2000 Ten Years after Yemeni Unity 
05/16/2000 Lebanese Resistance between Supporters and Opponents 
05/23/2000 Questionings on al-Jazeera Channel 
06/06/2000 Palestinian Issue after the Liberation of South Lebanon 
06/20/2000 Arab Attitudes toward the Siege of Iraq 
06/27/2000 Arabic song between the old and the new 
07/04/2000 Sudan’s Amnesty between Support and Opposition 
07/25/2000 Islamic movements in Morocco: Reality and Challenges 
08/01/2000 Arab Bloc Formation Where to? 
08/08/2000 Conflict between Literature and Religion 
08/15/2000 Ten Years after Yemeni Unity 
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08/22/2000 Palestinian Steadfastness in Camp David 
08/29/2000 Lebanon’s Elections of the Year 2000 
09/05/2000 Asian Labor Force on the Gulf and its effects 
09/12/2000 Crisis of the relationship between Iraq and Arab League 
09/19/2000 Palestinian State and the Mechanisms of Its Establishment 
09/26/2000 Peace movements in Israel 
10/03/2000 Attitudes of the Arab Street toward what happens in Jerusalem 
10/10/2000 Israel’s Nazi Barbarism 
10/17/2000 Next Arab Summit… Where to? 
10/24/2000 Jihad and Its Role in the Face of the Zionist Enemy 
10/31/2000 Arab Media and al-Aqsa Intifada 
11/07/2000 Lebanon’s Elections and Hariri became the Prime Minister 
11/14/2000 The Doha Islamic Summit and the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
11/21/2000 Democracy of U.S. Elections 
11/28/2000 Al-Aqsa Intifada from the Popular Revolution to the Armed Uprising 
12/05/2000 Boycotting American Goods: Between Support and Opposition 
12/12/2000 American presence in the Gulf region 
12/19/2000 Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan 
12/26/2000 Impact of negotiations on Palestinian Intifada 
01/09/2001 Conflict over Western Sahara between Morocco and Polisario 
01/16/2001 The Return of Violence to Algeria 
01/23/2001 Arab support of the Intifada 
01/30/2001 Turkey and Armenian massacres 
02/06/2001 The Tenth Anniversary of the Siege of Iraq 
02/13/2001 Draft Charter in Bahrain 
02/15/2001 Israel and European Democracy  
02/20/2001 Human Rights in Tunisia 
02/27/2001 Islamic Satellite Channels: Necessity or Luxury  
03/06/2001 Sharon Government and the Arab Citizens of Israel 
03/13/2001 Cultural, Political and Economic Developments in Syria 
03/20/2001 America’s Recklessness with the Arab and Their Issues 
03/27/2001 The Taliban Movement and the Destruction of Buddhist Statues 
04/03/2001 Arab Summits and Systems of Government 
04/10/2001 Civil Society in the Arab Countries 
04/17/2001 The Arabs and the Palestinian Issue 
04/24/2001 Representation of the Maronites in Lebanon 
05/01/2001 Arab Citizens of Israel and What is Happening to Their Fellow Palestinians 
05/08/2001 Berber Unrest in the Kabyle Region in Algeria 
05/15/2001 Zionism and Nazism 
05/22/2001 Arab Official and Popular Shameful Silence toward the Intifada  
05/29/2001 Mauritanian regime and Arab regimes 
06/05/2001 United States of Africa 
06/12/2001 The American enemy 
06/19/2001 The Abortion of the Intifada 
06/26/2001 Arab Oil 
07/03/2001 Prosecution of rulers 
07/10/2001 Bin Laden and the Arab Despair and the American Fear ** 
07/17/2001 Amnesty International 40th Anniversary 
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07/24/2001 International Emergency Forces and Border Espionage 
07/31/2001 Western Revolt against Globalization 
08/07/2001 Economic Crisis in Lebanon 
08/14/2001 Islamic Resistance Movement 
08/21/2001 Battle of Freedoms in Lebanon 
08/28/2001 Arabic Language 
09/04/2001 Global Campaign against Racism 
09/18/2001 Explosions of America 
09/25/2001 Islamic Groups and the West 
10/02/2001 Pakistan and Afghanistan Dilemma 
10/09/2001 Alternative to the Taliban’s Government 
10/16/2001 Expanding Fight against Terrorism 
10/23/2001 Arabs and U.S. Campaign against Afghanistan 
10/30/2001 Western Democracy and the New War  
11/06/2001 Future of Globalization after the Events of America 
11/13/2001 Future of Liberation Movements after Accused of Terrorism 
11/20/2001 Freedom of American Media 
11/27/2001 The Palestinian Cause and Osama Bin Laden 
12/04/2001 Can America “Afghanistanize” Iraq? 
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Appendix B: Translation of the opening questions for episodes analyzed   
Example One: 
(1) What is this blatant formal Western hypocrisy? Why did they sentence the historian David 
Irving yesterday to a three-year jail term only for his questioning the number of people who died 
in the Jewish Holocaust while they consider the action of the Danish newspaper that disgraced the 
holiest Islamic sanctities simply freedom of expression? 
(2) One has to wonder, is there slightest doubt that we are confronting a conflict of civilizations 
that the arrogant ruling juntas in the West impose upon us? 
(3) Haven’t the rest of Western newspapers prepared to propagate the Danish abuse (of Islam), 
thus emphasizing the West’s official position on Islam and Muslims? 
(4) Another adds, who originated the “Clash of Civilizations” argument? Was this argument 
originated by Muslims or by the American thinker Samuel Huntington who draws parallels 
between the new imperialism and what they call globalization? Shouldn’t the initiator bear the 
brunt of blame? 
(5) Some Arab leaders call for a dialogue among civilizations. Isn’t this kind of fooling 
themselves? 
(6) Isn’t it a new Crusade through which masters of the Western world ant to entrap the religion 
followers into religious conflicts for the purpose of dominance and hegemony? 
(7) Hasn’t Huntington’s theory become marketing for a programmed plan aiming to eliminate 
Eastern inheritance? 
(8) Hasn’t France objected to Turkey’s joining in the European Union under the pretense that the 
European Union is a Christian club? 
(9) But on the other hand, why accusing the Western thinkers of fabricating conflict of 
civilizations? 
(10) Wasn’t the Moroccan thinker al-Mahdi al-Manjara the first who talked about the clash of 
civilizations three years before Huntington? 
(11) Why limiting the conflict between the West and Islam? 
(12) Why hasn’t Huntington talked about a conflict with Chinese civilization? 
(13) Hadn’t the term “conflict of civilizations” remained merely conflicts among intellectuals on 
the pages of newspapers until Bin Laden decided to bomb the World Trade Center’s twin towers 
in America, when the clash of civilizations translated into reality? 
(14) Isn't it a conflict between the modern concept of religion within the system of democracy and 
the concept of totalitarianism represented by political Islam? 
(15) Another adds, who attracted the bear to its nobility? Wasn’t it al-Qaeda? 
Example Two: 
(1) How can we Arabs enter the twenty-first century while Arab women are still demanding their 
basic rights and heavy restrictions are still placed upon them? Some even say that the history of 
women is really the history of persecution, what are the dimensions of this issue? 
(2) Is it just a conflict between men and women or it has social, political, economic and religious 
dimensions that are intertwined? 
(3) Does religion play a role in the oppression of women, as some claim, or religion, for that 
matter, is innocent? 
(4) In the end, if women are the victims are they the victims of outdated customs and traditions? 
(5) The question here is why women’s liberation movements have failed in the Arab world? 
(6) Is it because they went on the wrong direction? 
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(7) Why did the defense for women, in some cases, resemble the struggle against Colonialism and 
slavery? 
(8) Why do some women’s movements become hostile to men as if men are against women? 
(9) Is the idea of women’s liberation similar to or just part of the Western cultural invasion? 
(10) Why do some Western countries support women’s conferences in the Arab states? 
(11) Is the situation of women in the West much better than that of Arab women? 
(12) Didn’t women’s movements in the West fall out of their concepts that they proposed to 
liberate women? 
Example Three: 
(1) Why have Arab gateways fallen one after another? 
(2) Yesterday the Eastern gateway Iraq fell and lost its Arab identity and now it’s Sudan’s turn as 
the gateway of the Arabs to Africa.  
(3) Will Sudan remain Arab after these successive conspiracies to fragmentize it ethnically and 
religiously? 
(4) Will South move to secession after the new wave of mutual accusations between the 
Southerners and Northerners? 
(5) Isn’t Darfur in danger after a wedge is driven between Arabs and Africans? 
(6) Isn’t it incumbent upon the Arabs to preserve the Arabism of Sudan before it is too late? 
(7) How are those Sudanese that doubt about the Arab identity of Sudan different from those 
Iraqis that came at the back of the American tanks and devoted all their efforts to deprive Iraq of 
its Arab identity? 
(8) Doesn’t America want to remove Arab and Islamic identity from Sudan and change this 
identity to a black African identity pro forma and essentially to a Christian Zionist identity?  
(9) Why do some people want to Africanize Sudan if millions of Africans feel connected to the 
Arab culture and proud of it?  
(10) But on the other hand, hasn’t John Garang stressed that Sudan is non-Arab, that the Arabs are 
the minority and the majority are black Africans, and that the identity of Sudan is African rather 
than Arab or Islamic?  
(11) Hasn’t the late President of Senegal Senghor said that Sudan could have become the best 
among the Africans if it hasn’t chosen to become the worst among the Arabs? 
(12) Why do some people want Sudan to become the gateway of the Arabs to Africa while at the 
same time many Arabs do not recognize Sudan as an Arab entity and do not care about it? 
(13) What did Sudanese gain from the so-called Arab League? 
(14) Haven’t the fewest Arabs bet on Sudan’s unity? 
(15) Who is the one that welcomed the separatists and embraced the bold non-Arab neighbors of 
Sudan? 
Example Three: 
(1) Have the Western media slogan in general and the American media slogan in particular 
become “No voice is louder than the voice of war”?  
(2) Have the Western mass media become mouthpieces for Western governments?  
(3) Why have the Western news media lost their abilities to listen to any opposing opinions?  
(4) Why was the al-Jazeera bureau in Afghanistan bombed?  
(5) Are the Western media really free?  
(6) Have the events of America come to expose the falsehood of the Western media?  
(7) One of them says that there is always a “Maestro” manipulating the Western media behind the 
scene in normal conditions, but this Maestro soon come to the fore in difficult time, as what 
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happens now. Hence some commentators question: Will we see the establishment of ministries of 
information in the West as we have seen the establishment of the ministries of national security?  
(8) Why have we begun to hear of “rapid media deterrence forces” to muffle any voices that fail to 
please the West?  
(9) Has the fig leaf fallen entirely from the Western media?  
(10) But on the other hand, isn’t the media war an essential part of the military war, making it any 
country’s right to use any means to win the war?  
(11) Isn’t it the Western media’s right to fashion their coverage to adapt to the exceptional 
circumstances that the United States is going through?  
(12) Isn’t the overwhelming public opinion supportive of the Western policies at this time, thus 
making it impossible for the Western media not to conform to the overall atmosphere?  
(13) Isn’t it very unfair to accuse the Western media of becoming a mouthpiece for the 
government or public relations machinery?  
(14) Isn’t it also an exaggeration to assert that the Western media has become a replica of the 
media under repressive dictatorships that plague the third world?  
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